Relative to its overall statewide support, the Republican Party has been overrepresented in Congressional delegations and state legislatures over the last decade in a number of U.S. states. A challenge is to determine the extent to which this can be explained by intentional gerrymandering as opposed to an underlying inefficient distribution of Democrats in cities. We explain the "spatial inefficiency" of support for Democrats, and demonstrate that it varies substantially both across states and also across legislative chambers within states. We introduce a simple method for measuring this inefficiency by assessing the partisanship of the nearest neighbors of each voter in each U.S. state. Our measure of spatial efficiency helps explain cross-state patterns in legislative representation, and allows us to verify that political geography contributes substantially to inequalities in political representation. At the same time, however, we also show that even after controlling for spatial efficiency, partisan control of the redistricting process has had a substantial impact on the parties' seat shares.
There are two related explanations for this underrepresentation of Democrats in legislatures. The first is partisan gerrymandering -the construction of electoral district boundaries to advantage one party over the other. These strategies are successful because when a party wins a district by more than 50% + 1 votes, the votes of other supporters in the district are effectively wasted. The party wins the seat whether it has 51% of the vote or 99% of the vote. Thus by "packing" supporters of the opposition party into districts where they win by very large margins, and spreading one's own supporters out so one never wins by more than a small but comfortable margin, party leaders can maximize the number of seats they win by minimizing the number of their supporters' votes that are wasted.
1 There is clear evidence of Republican efforts to draw legislative boundaries to their advantage (McGann et al. 2016) , and in states where Republicans have controlled the redistricting process, the resulting districts strongly favor Republican representation (Royden and Li 2017; Stephanopoulos Forthcoming; Stephanopoulos and McGhee 2015) .
The second explanation for why Democrats often do not win as many seats as one
1 Consider a state with 50 Democratic voters, 50 Republican voters, and 4 districts, each of which must contain the same number of voters. Given the overall distribution of voters, one might expect 2 seats to go to Democrats and 2 to go to Republicans. But one can also create a districting plan where one district has 25 Democrats, two districts have 17 Republicans and 8 Democrats, and one district has 16 Republicans and 9 Democrats. In that configuration, Republicans get 3 seats, and Democrats get 1.
1 might expect given their overall support is less nefarious: Democratic and Republican voters are spatially distributed in very different ways, and in many states, this difference puts Democrats at a disadvantage under a system in which representation is based on spatially contiguous, geometrically compact electoral districts, even if these are drawn without partisan intent. In particular, Democrats tend to be spatially clustered in politically homogeneous cities, while Republicans are spread out in more heterogeneous suburbs and rural areas. As a result, a districting plan that creates relatively compact districts will end up creating urban districts that have far more Democratic voters than the minimum 50% + 1 required to win the district, resulting in many "wasted" Democratic votes. Republicans, by contrast, tend to live in areas that are more heterogeneous, leading to the creation of districts where Republicans win districts by narrower margins, thus wasting fewer Republican votes.
In order to set aside the potentially partisan interests of those drawing redistricting plans and examine the role of political geography, scholars have used computer simulations to draw relatively compact, contiguous districts without regard for partisanship in individual states, often with the explicit goal of contrasting a sample of such districting plans with those actually implemented by state legislatures (Chen 2017; Chen and Rodden 2015; Cho and Liu 2016; Magleby and Mosesson 2018; Pegden N.d.) . Chen and Rodden (2013) and Chen and Cottrell (2016) conduct such analysis for a large number of states, and find that Democrats are often, but not always, at a disadvantage in hypothetical districts drawn via simulations.
There is broad agreement that this bias has something to do with the clustering of Democrats in cities, but beyond that, little is known about the nature or prevalence of this phenomenon or its variation within or across states. At one extreme, attorneys for the defense in several recent partisan gerrymandering lawsuits have made the blanket argument that be-cause Democrats are clustered in cities, Republican map-drawers cannot be held responsible for large asymmetries in the transformation of votes to seats in states like Wisconsin, Florida, and Pennsylvania.
2 Without evidence, they claim that political geography can fully explain the under-representation of Democrats in legislatures. At the opposite extreme, McGann et al. (2016) claim that the over-representation of Republicans can be explained exclusively by partisan gerrymandering, and has nothing to do with political geography. Somewhere between these extremes, Stephanopoulos (Forthcoming) indicates that Democrats tend to waste slightly more votes in states with higher urbanization rates, and Chen and Rodden (2013) observe cross-state heterogeneity related to long-term trends in city growth.
To date, the nature of the Democrats' spatial inefficiency across states has not yet been fully understood or measured. This paper provides a conceptual framework for understanding the conditions under which political geography works against the representation of Democrats, a strategy for measuring this phenomenon, and a simple way to assess whether partisan control of the redistricting process has enhanced or assuaged it.
First, we point out that spatial concentration of voters for one of the parties in cities is not a sufficient condition for under-representation in a system of winner-take-all districts.
Spatial inefficiency emerges in the presence of urban-rural partisan polarization only when cities are either too large or too small relative to the size of districts. Where cities are very large relative to the scale of electoral districts, at least some districts will necessarily encompass predominantly Democratic areas, leading to an inefficient distribution of voters.
By contrast, where cities are very small relative to the scale of districts, there will actually be too few Democrats to form winning majorities. Thus the nature of the Democrats' spatial inefficiency can change substantially even within states as one moves between the spatial scale of state lower chambers, upper chambers, and the scale of the U.S. Congress.
The key contribution of this paper is to measure the relative spatial efficiency of the parties for each legislative chamber in 49 U.S. states without relying on districts drawn by politicians or computer algorithms. To achieve this, we borrow from spatial point pattern analysis that was developed in the field of plant ecology. In short, the representational disadvantage associated with the Democrats' urban concentration depends on the size and arrangement of cities combined with the scale at which districts must be drawn. Some such arrangements do no harm to either party.
To see this, let us draw on the insights from the classic work of Gudgin and Taylor (1979) . Guided by Great Britain, they imagine a society in which cities are segregated by class and partisanship, and where each city is divided into several electoral districts, where the size of the districts is larger than the homogeneous "working class" and "professional"
clusters. They show how the imposition of random equal-population partitions to create winner-take-all districts in this context can lead to a distribution of partisanship across districts that approximates a symmetric, normal distribution, which generates a votes-toseats relationship something like the familiar "cube law" identified by Kendall and Stuart (1950) .
Their logic can be applied to the contemporary U.S. setting in which Republican voting is a positive function of distance from the city center. The analogous scenario is one in which urban core areas are uniformly small relative to the size of legislative districts. For ease of exposition, let us examine a stylized example of a polity whose voters are distributed along a single geographic dimension. Figure 1 Let us imagine that this polity must be apportioned into six districts of equal size, the boundaries of which are portrayed with vertical bars. Each district contains 8 voters, and is hence larger than the scale of the Democratic and Republican clusters. The two parties are evenly matched in four of the resulting districts, which inevitably contain urban, suburban, and rural areas, while the Democrats can expect a majority in one district that ends up slightly more urban, and the Republicans can anticipate a majority in one district that ends up slightly more rural. Thus the distribution of expected partisanship across districts is symmetric with a large peak in the middle. Such a polity is portrayed in Figure 2 , which has one large city that votes overwhelmingly for the Democrats, surrounded by heterogeneous suburbs and a rural periphery that vote for the Republicans. It also contains a medium-sized city and a small town, both surrounded by Republican-leaning suburbs and rural periphery. Again, let us examine what happens when this evenly divided polity is partitioned into 9 six districts of equal size. Because Democrats are inefficiently packed into the large city, the cross-district distribution of Republican vote shares has a pronounced left skew, and Democrats win only 42 percent of the seats in spite of winning half the votes. This is an example of the classic case of electoral bias owing to an inefficient geographic clustering described by Brookes (1960) , Johnston (1977) , and Gudgin and Taylor (1979) .
Next, in order to get a broader sense of the transformation of votes to seats in this polity, let us consider scenarios in which one of the parties suffers from a scandal or benefits from a strong economy and the election is no longer tied. To do so, we simulate 10,000 elections in which one voter is randomly selected to switch from D to R, then do the same for two voters, three voters, and so on until the R party wins all of the votes. We conduct the same exercise in the opposite direction. For each scenario, we calculate the average seat share across all simulations that would be produced by the districting scheme displayed in Figures 1 and 2 .
The resulting vote-seat curves are displayed in Figure 3 . The dashed line in Figure 3 shows simulated seat shares from Example 1. As the figure shows, simulations generate a standard majoritarian vote-seat curve for the polity, which also closely approximates the cube law. For comparison, the dotted line represents proportionality.
The bold line in Figure 3 shows the simulated vote-seat curve for our polity in Example 2. Several features of this curve are noteworthy. First, the curve is flatter and closer to proportionality than the dashed curve from Example 1. Because of the greater relative clustering of the Democrats, it is able to win more seats when it performs badly (on the right side of the graph) than would have been the case with a more even distribution of support across cities. This is because it is able to win seats in its urban core support area 11 even when it performs very badly overall.
Because the support for the Democrats is so concentrated in cities, the Republicans are able to string together suburban and rural voters in districts that they win with slim majorities, and relative to the more even distribution of cities portrayed by the dashed line, they are able to win a seat bonus when they are in the minority, and in the case of a tied election. Of course, the latter case carries considerable normative importance in democratic theory.
The bold curve (Example 2) displays an asymmetry that is not present in the dashed curve (Example 1). In general, the Republican party can expect a larger seat "bonus" than the Democrats -while for some vote shares Democrats get more seats than Republicans in Example 2 than Example 1, on the whole these differences favor Republicans. Most notably, the Republicans can expect a majority of seats with only 45 percent of the votes. Likewise, they can achieve proportional representation with 40 percent of the votes, while the the Democrats can only expect 30 percent of the seats with a similar vote share.
Measuring Spatial Efficiency
Example 1 captures a scenario in which, even though the Democrats reside in cities, the spatial efficiency of both parties is identical. Example 2 captures a situation in which urban concentration causes the Democrats' support to be relatively inefficient. The next task is to devise a measure of the parties' relative support efficiency in a way that facilitates comparisons within states at different spatial scales, and across states with very different levels of support for Democrats and Republicans. Our ultimate goal is to explore how these differences in spatial efficiency translate into representation.
Returning to the two simple examples above, we needn't have actually drawn districts to have understood the superiority of the second geographic pattern for the R party. We could also examine each individual voter, and count the number of co-partisans among his or her eight nearest neighbors. In the first example with small, evenly spaced cities, every voter lives in a competitive neighborhood with somewhere between 3 and 5 co-partisans. There are no "landslide" neighborhoods that could give rise to a landslide district. However, in the example with a large city, 75 percent of the Republicans live in competitive neighborhoods, but only 38 percent of Democrats do. The large majority of Democrats live in "landslide"
neighborhoods with Democratic super-majorities.
We can take this same simple neighborhood-based approach to the U.S. states. We In Figure 6 , we plot this value against the statewide vote share for each party at each legislative scale in each state, using a local polynomial smoother with 95 percent confidence intervals. Each state enters the data set six times, once for each party at each of three legislative scales. We drop the Congressional observation for states with fewer than 4 Congressional seats. The graphs look quite similar if we examine one legislative chamber at a time, or if we adopt different ways of characterizing competitive neighborhoods. 
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In short, Figure 6 is a good guide to the nature of the Democrats' geography problem.
Because of their concentration in larger cities, they allow the Republicans an advantage in winning competitive seats. That is, Republicans are positioned to over-perform relative to their vote share. This is true not only in purple states, but especially in "blue" states where Democrats win large majorities. In "red" states, again because of their concentration in cities, Democrats are poorly positioned to over-perform. We term voters in neighborhoods that are 40% -60% "efficient" because they are neither clustered enough they are likely to end up in landslide districts, but also well enough clustered to potentially for a competitive district. Moreover, in addition to having this intuitive rationale, as shown in Appendix A this choice seems to best predict seat shares.
Spatial Efficiency and Representation

9
If having voters concentrated in efficient neighborhoods improves a party's ability to convert their support into seats, then we should see that increasing the share of Republican 7 While it may seem intuitive to see Republican Efficiency and Democratic Efficiency as mechanically related, this is not the case. To illustrate, consider a single, square state that is uniformly Democratic on the left and uniformly Republican on the right. Assume the state is large enough with respect to districts that Democrats on the left edge are in 100% Democratic neighborhoods and Republicans on the right edge are in 100% Republican neighborhoods. Now double the number of Democrats on the left edge of the state -this will drive down the share of Democrats in 40-60% neighborhoods (as the number of Democrats in the middle of the state near Republicans is unchanged, while the number of Democrats in 100% Democratic districts has increased), while leaving the share of Republicans in 40-60% districts unchanged.
8 Due to coarseness of seat shares, US House of Representatives observations are not included states with 3 or fewer seats in the US House -AK, DE, HI, ID, ME, MT, ND, NH, RI, NE, NM, SD,VT, WY, and WV. Oregon is also excluded from all analyses as all-mail-in elections preclude estimating the spatial distribution of voters using precinct-level returns. Note finally that Nebraska has no lower legislative chamber.
9 It is worth noting that for extreme vote shares, having voters in the "efficient" window for 40%-60% is actually potentially inefficient. At a vote share of 80%, for example, an ideal distribution would for all voters to be in 80% neighborhoods, resulting in districts that all have 80% vote shares and thus all have 30% margins against swings in support. In reality, however, given our focus on states between 35% and 65% vote shares and the fact that even in the extremes of that range voters are nowhere near optimal limits means that these considerations do not come into play empirically. voters in efficient neighborhoods should increase Republican seat shares (at a given Republican vote share), and increasing the share of Democratic voters in efficient neighborhoods should decrease Republican seat shares (at a given Republican vote share).
The inclusion of an interaction of voter efficiency with overall vote share reflects the fact that voter efficiency is an influence-multiplier, not a direct input into representation. To illustrate, consider a legislature with 10 seats in a state with 100 voters (10 voters per seat).
If the Republican vote share is 40%, then a perfectly efficient distribution of Republicans results in Republicans winning six seats.
10 A perfectly inefficient distribution, by contrast, would leave them with only two seats. 11 Consequently, with a 40% vote share, their potential gain from spatial efficiency is four additional seats.
However, if we increase the Republican vote share from 40% to 50%, then a perfectly efficient distribution of Republicans would result in Republicans winning eight seats, 12 , while a perfectly inefficient distribution would result in winning only three seats. 13 Thus the "efficiency bonus" at a 50% vote share would be would be five seats, an increase of 25% over their "efficiency bonus" of four seats at a 40% vote share, an increase proportionate to the increase in overall vote share in this example.
While these examples illustrate the intuition that spatial efficiency will generally increase the representational return for each of a party's voters, it is important not to press this logic too far. Our measure of spatial efficiency is abstract and divorced from strategic considerations. The fact that a voter is in a neighborhood that is 50% Democratic does not mean that voter will end up in a district that is 50% Democratic for two reasons.
10 Six Republicans in each of six districts, four in a seventh, and zero in the remaining districts. 11 Ten in one district, six in a second, and three in all remaining districts. 12 Six Republicans in each of eight districts, two and zero in the remaining districts. 13 Ten, ten and nine in three districts, three in all others. To ensure reliable estimates of the interaction terms β 1 and β 2 , we restrict our analysis to values of Republican vote share for which there is substantial common support for voter efficiency (Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu 2018) . Given the distribution of voter efficiencies (shown in Appendix B), this amounts to limiting our attention to states with long-run
Republican vote shares between 34% and 63%. 14 However, as shown in Appendix C the 14 The lack of common support for highly Republican and highly Democratic states is unsurprising -in a state that is almost entirely Republicans, for example, most Republicans will necessarily live in neighborhoods that are largely Republican, and thus inefficient. As a result, there are almost no "high efficiency" observations in the tails of the Republican vote share distribution.
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results that follow are robust to not including this restriction.
Results of this estimation are presented in Table 1 . For ease of interpretation, the table include both raw coefficient estimates and our calculated quantity of interest: the estimated marginal partial correlation of voter efficiency and Republican seat share at a 50%/50% overall vote share (β 1 * 0.5 + ψ 1 for Republicans and β 2 * 0.5 + ψ 2 for Democrats).
Across specifications, the results show precisely the relationship between spatial efficiency and seats in the legislature predicted by theory. In all five specifications presented, the partial correlation between Republican seat share and the share of Republican voters in efficient neighborhoods in a 50/50 state is positive, and in all five specifications the correlation for Democratic voters is negative. Moreover, in all but one specification, inclusion of measures of spatial efficiency are jointly significant. Most impressively, while the coefficients are not individually significant when state-fixed effects are included, they remain jointly significant, and the point estimates with state fixed effects are stable and in the theoretically predicted direction. As shown in Appendix A, results look similar when we use either a wider or a narrower bandwidths to define an "efficient" neighborhood, and Appendix C shows results without the common support restriction.
What is the role of gerrymandering?
The preceding analysis makes clear that the spatial distribution of voters plays a role in shaping the transformation of votes into seats. However, the preceding analysis does not imply that all inequalities in the transformation of voters into seats are due to voter geography.
In this section, we examine the possibility that deliberate political gerrymandering may In particular, we examine whether control of the districting process appears to give parties additional advantages in legislative representation even after controlling for the spatial efficiency of voters.
To test for this possibility, we estimate the same simple models as above, focusing only on elections since the last round of redistricting, and we add dummy variables capturing the partisanship of the entities responsible for drawing district boundaries. One indicator variable takes on the value 1 if Democrats had unified control over the redistricting process for the chamber in question after the 2010 census, and zero otherwise. Another indicator variable takes on the value 1 if Republicans had unified control, and zero otherwise. Both of these variables take on the value zero in instances of divided control, independent commissions, or court-drawn plans. We also include an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 if the state was, at the time of redistricting, required by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) to seek approval from the Department of Justice for any modifications to its electoral laws. Section 5 of the VRA gave the Department of Justice the responsibility to block redistricting proposals that had potential to dilute the ability of minority voters to elect candidates of their choice, and thus constrained the choices of state legislatures.
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The results of these models are displayed in Table 2 and Congressional districts respectively. The coefficients for the VRA variable suggest that controlling for partisan control of the redistricting process and the spatial efficiency of partisanship, states subjected to Section Five oversight had marginally higher Democratic seat shares, though not significantly so. * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01
State-Level Analysis
In this section, we examine outliers in order to draw further inferences about the 2012 round of redistricting. We first re-run the pooled regression specification (Equation 1) analogous plots for tighter and looser bandwidths can be found in the Appendix E.
Note that our model is estimated using a set of states that includes those whose districts were drawn under unified partisan control as well as by non-partisan actors and divided governments. It would be preferable to estimate the model based only on the non-partisan states in order to have a non-partisan baseline, but, unfortunately, the number of such states in the most recent round of redistricting was simply too small. As a result, estimates will be biased in the direction of overall average gerrymanders. Given that Republicans controlled redistricting in far more states than Democrats in 2010, this suggests the results will tend to understate Republican gerrymanders. Consequently, these graphs should not be interpreted as constituting a "test" for gerrymandering. Rather, they allow for the identification of outliers relative to a baseline that is itself likely shaped by efforts at gerrymandering. It is especially worthwhile to examine the cases where plaintiffs have filed lawsuits related to partisan gerrymandering. For example, the Wisconsin lower chamber at issue in Gill v. Whitford is a significant outlier in the first plot in Figure 7 . This is consistent with the assertion by litigants (supported by simulations) that much of the disproportionate representation of Republicans is explained by efforts to "pack" and "crack" Democrats, and not by an especially inefficient distribution of Democrats.
The third plot in Figure 7 also shows that, as argued in Benisek v. Lamone, the In order to differentiate intentional gerrymandering from underlying spatial inefficiency, courts have relied upon testimony that compares enacted redistricting plans with ensembles of simulated redistricting plans. While our analysis does not provide a formal test of gerrymandering -our measure of spatial clustering lacks the sophistication necessary to capture exactly how the distribution of voters "should" map onto seat allocations at a level of reliability appropriate for evaluating the maps of individual states on its own -this analysis of 33 partisan neighborhoods is a potentially useful complement to simulations. It requires only a few lines of transparent code, and does not require the researcher to defend a particular approach to the simulation of alternative districting plans or to pick which simulated results constitute reasonable baselines. Moreover, the cross-state, cross-chamber approach used here allows us to more directly identify why certain maps tend to advantage one party over the other.
Conclusion
As We choose this approach because it is intuitive and simple, but a variety of other approaches are also sensible. We operationalize efficiency by saying a voter resides in an efficient neighborhood if their individual neighborhood is between 40% and 60% co-partisan. This reflects our intuition that an efficient neighborhood in one in which voters are neither so concentrated that they will necessarily give rise to districts that are substantially more than 50% one party, nor so disbursed that they could never form a district in which they are a majority.
To understand the rational for extending this range below 50%, it is important to note the distinction between the share of a district that is co-partisan and the share of voter's neighborhoods that are co-partisan. To illustrate this distinction, consider the example of a spatial distribution of voters shown in Figure 8 . In this Figure, the red box encloses a perfectly efficient district -it is composed of 50% + 1 Republican voters. Note, however, that only the neighborhood centered on the center-most voter is more than 50% co-partisan -in all other cases, voter's neighborhoods are less than 50% co-partisan. This is, of course, an extreme example. In most cases, voters are not surrounded by non-co-partisans. But this figure does illustrate that a 50% + 1 district will not generally be composed of voters whose neighborhoods are also precisely 50% + 1 co-partisan, leading to our use of a 40% to 60% interval to define efficient neighborhoods.
Substantiating this assumption, Figure 9 plots the explanatory power of spatial efficiency measured using different bandwidths and center points when estimating Equation 1. As the figure shows, the explanatory power of spatial efficiency is similar across many parameters, but generally highest with a center-point of 50%. 
